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Abstract 
 
Changes to the Federal Home Loan Bank System since the Great Recession 
John Simone 





The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System underwent changes following the 
recent financial crisis known as the Great Recession (2007-2009). Specifically, the FHLB 
System has been lending more to insurance companies, has become more involved in its 
mortgage partnership finance (MPF) programs, will see an unprecedented merger 
between two Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), and could potentially realize a 
major overhaul to its membership requirements. Its membership requirements changes 
could result in path dependency with increasing returns for the FHLB System. This paper 
will focus on these occurring and potential changes. These observances allude to the fact 
that the customer bases, products offered, and structure of the FHLB System could have 
shifted since the beginning of, or will shift as a result of, the Great Recession. With an 
entity as large as the FHLB System, the risks posed by these changes could be systemic. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) created in 1932 for the purpose of allowing more Americans to achieve 
home ownership.  The FHLB System is comprised of 12 regional banks located in 
Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Chicago, Des Moines, 
Topeka, Dallas, Seattle, and San Francisco. The Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) 
lend money to banks (and other select institutions) so that those banks can issue 
mortgages, and each FHLBank is technically its own entity. Operating as individual 
entities allows each FHLBank to offer slightly different products to its member banks, 
but for the most part the products of the FHLBanks are very similar. 
 Respective member institutions cooperatively own each FHLBank, and 
FHLBank stock is not publicly traded. The System does have loose central guidance in 
the form of the Council of FHLBanks. The FHLB System receives the funds it lends to 
banks from issuing debt securities through the Office of Finance, but does have a line of 
credit with the U.S. Treasury. FHLBanks enjoy what is referred to as a ‘super lien’ on 
banks. This means in the event a bank fails and it owes money to an FHLBank, the 
FHLBank can collect repayments first, even before the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). Since 1932, the FHLB System has slowly undergone changes in its 
activity, but following the recent financial crisis (or Great Recession) these changes have 
been more frequent and may prove to be more sweeping. Since the start of the Great 
Recession in 2007, the FHLB System has sought out new customer bases, offered new 
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products and services, and could see changes to its structure and membership 
requirements. While the FHLBanks can revert to their traditional customers and products 
in the long run, changes to its membership requirements may instill path dependency into 
the FHLB System. These new markets, products, and other changes could have a 
significant impact on the economy of the United States and subsequently the global 
economy.  
GSEs are perceived to be quasi-governmental entities. This happens because 
while they can be privately owned, as is the case with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they 
are publicly chartered and exist to serve a public service, such as providing demand in the 
secondary mortgage market. GSEs are typically thought of as intermediaries as they 
fulfill a purpose deemed important by the federal government, but are not themselves 
government entities. However, these public charters provide GSEs with a funding 
advantage over their private competitors in the form of an implicit guarantee. The 
implicit guarantee means it is implied, although not explicitly stated that the federal 
government will cover their debt in the event of a default. This implicit guarantee allows 
GSEs to borrow at cheaper rates than its private competitors because investors believe 
their debt to be less risky as the government will cover any shortfalls.  
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLB System comprise the U.S. Housing 
GSEs, whose primary mission is to provide banks with the necessary liquidity to issue 
mortgages. The FHLB System accomplishes this task by making over-collateralized 
loans to banks known as ‘advances’ while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accomplish this 
task by purchasing mortgages directly from banks. The housing GSEs were a focal point 
of the Great Recession and took heavy criticism for their perceived role in the crisis. In 
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2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were given federal bailouts because they were on the 
brink of insolvency. 
Even before 2008, but especially after, there has been debate about whether GSEs 
should exist. Some believe entities should be explicitly public or explicitly private to 
remove any ambiguity, especially when that ambiguity results in a funding advantage. 
These critics argue 2008 is proof that the GSE is a failed business model, and perhaps 
homeownership is not as socially beneficial as previously thought. Homeownership was 
seen in 1932 as a community and economic pillar, similar to how it is seen today. 
However, some view this as an antiquated notion. Prior to 2008, housing values had been 
steadily climbing for many years, and housing was seen as a relatively safe way to 
increase one’s net worth. During the Great Recession, the value of homes plummeted and 
perhaps changed the way Americans view homeownership as the path to prosperity. 
With total combined assets of over $900 billion as-of December 31, 2014 (Federal 
Home Loan Banks, 2014), the FHLB System is a large, important, and understudied 
entity. Eric Weiss, who is a specialist in financial economics at the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), was able to confirm this when he said there is “not a concern 
around Washington” (telephone interview, October 15, 2013) about the Federal Home 
Loan Bank System because currently it is in pretty good financial shape and has a sound 
[cooperative] structure. He believes there may be interest in the System after Fannie and 
Freddie are sorted out, but the CRS has not received any questions related to it in quite 
some time. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline the changes to the FHLB System as a result 
of the recent financial crisis, and the paper will be broken up into several sections. First, I 
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will give an overview of some changes made to Federal Home Loan Bank System in 
response to financial crises. The next several sections will discuss the changes to the 
FHLB System as a result of the Great Recession, specifically lending to insurance 
companies, its mortgage partnership finance (MPF) programs, and what the future may 
hold for the FHLB System. Finally, I will offer some concluding remarks. 
 
CHAPTER 2: FHLB SYSTEM CHANGES DUE TO FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
The FHLB System has seen several economic downturns since its creation in 
1932, but the two that have had the biggest impact have been the Savings and Loan Crisis 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Great Recession. Before the Savings and Loan 
Crisis, the FHLB System could only lend to savings and loans1, savings banks, and 
insurance companies. This was by design as these entities could not borrow from the 
Federal Reserve until the early 1980s and so the FHLB System was the easiest source of 
liquidity for these entities. However, once savings and loans became eligible to borrow 
from the Discount Window, one could argue the need for the FHLB System to exist 
disappeared.  
The Federal Reserve and the FHLB System provide similar services in the form 
of lending to depository institutions (both entities to a variety of other things, but there is 
significant overlap in this area), and this overlap could create competition, arbitrage, or 
other undesirable outcomes. It’s true that having both serve as lenders to depository 
institutions does better ensure that these depository institutions have ample access to 
                                                          
1 A savings and loan is a type of bank that is traditionally concentrated in mortgages and mortgage-related 
assets. 
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credit and liquidity, but perhaps having only one quasi-government agency perform this 
task would be safer and more efficient. 
Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA, which was legislation prompted by the Savings and Loan Crisis), the FHLB 
System acquired the ability to lend to commercial banks and credit unions. According to 
Hoffman and Cassell (2010), Herbert Hoover had wanted commercial banks to be 
eligible for FHLB membership in 1932, but the bankers themselves had no interest (p. 
54). Historically, commercial banks have had little incentive to issue residential 
mortgages to low net worth individuals, which could be the source of their lack of interest 
in FHLB membership.  
Hoffman and Cassell (2010) add that the Savings and Loan Crisis had resulted in 
significant financial losses for the FHLB System, which combined with a shrinking 
customer base as many savings and loans were failing, put a strain on the FHLB System 
(p. 55). To exacerbate matters, Congress mandated the FHLB System helped finance the 
Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCorp). The purpose of REFCorp was to bailout 
savings and loans and to cover deposits that were insured under the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC, or the savings and loan equivalent of the FDIC). As 
a result of the obligation to help finance REFCorp, Congress likely wanted to ensure the 
FHLB System was able to stay solvent, which led to allowing commercial banks to join 
the FHLB System. Interestingly enough, Hoffman and Cassell (2010) point out that the 
FHLBanks had to initially recruit commercial bank members and in order to do that had 
to add a wider variety of advances and other products (p. 55). Further, before the Savings 
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and Loan Crisis, the FHLB System owned Freddie Mac, and FIRREA spun Freddie off to 
be its own entity.  
 The FHLB System played an integral role during the Great Recession as banks 
preferred to borrow from it instead of the Federal Reserve. Some have claimed that 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve comes with a stigma, but borrowing from the 
FHLBanks does not carry this stigma. This was evidenced by the fact that the FHLB 
System lent more to banks than the Federal Reserve throughout the crisis. Before the 
Great Recession, the FHLB System was not seen as a primary bank lender, but now that 
banks know they can rely on it as a source of liquidity, its role may have permanently 
changed.2  
The Federal Home Loan Bank System is currently regulated by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which was created as a part of the Housing Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulated the 
FHLB System from its creation in 1932 until 1989, when that agency was dissolved as a 
result of the Savings and Loan Crisis. From 1989 until 2008, the Federal Housing 
Finance Board (FHFB) regulated the FHLB System, and was dissolved as a result of the 
Great Recession. All three regulators have been criticized for not providing adequate 
supervision into the activities of the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the first two were 
dissolved because of financial crises. While the FHFA has had more authoritative power 
than its predecessors, the FHLB System has still taken on new customers and products 
since 2008.  
                                                          
2 For more information on this topic, see Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame’s (2008) The Federal Home Loan 
Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort? 
  7 
 
One frequently cited reason for the Great Recession was that banks and other 
financial firms made unsafe loans to consumers then packaged the loans into mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). When the 
underlying loans of these products defaulted, investors took heavy losses. Banks are now 
required to uphold higher credit standards in lending as a result, and they have also been 
hesitant to lend to even qualified borrowers in fears of possible defaults. This has resulted 
in fewer loans issued, and thus, the need for fewer borrowings from the FHLBanks. 
According to Combined Financial Reports, total FHLB System advances went from an 
average of $780 billion in 2008 and 2009 to an average $396 billion from 2011-2013. 
Advances never dipped below $480 million from 2002-2006, and so the lack of advances 
after the Great Recession was not simply a return to normal activity.  
Net interest income, which is interest earned minus interest paid, went from an 
average of $5.3 billion in 2008 and 2009 to an average of $3.8 billion from 2011-2013. 
Net interest income hadn’t been below $4 billion since 2003. Even though net income 
went from $1.2 billion in 2008 to $2.5 billion in 2013, the decline in net interest income 
implies the FHLBanks are earning less income on their advances than in the past. Since 
banks make up a large majority of FHLB members (roughly 95 percent) and current 
advances are well below pre-crisis levels, one can assume the decline in advances and net 
interest income is related to a lack of demand for advances at banks, as well as a low 
interest rate environment. This lack of demand has forced the FHLBanks to turn to 
alternative income sources, such as the MPF programs, as well as lending to insurance 
companies. While it’s true the MPF programs and lending to insurance companies existed 
before the worst part of the Great Recession in the fall of 2008; these two business lines 
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will likely have to become more prominent revenue sources (at least in the short run) 
while lending to banks continues to stagnate. In addition, the incurred investment losses 
and concentration in one member institution put the FHLBank of Seattle in serious 
financial trouble before, during, and after the Great Recession, and this trouble spurred 
the merger with the FHLBank of Des Moines. In short, the Great Recession has caused 
the FHLB System as a whole to rethink its short-term business strategy, as well as 
directly led to a merger between two FHLBanks.  
 
CHAPTER 3: INSURANCE COMPANIES 
 
As previously stated, the FHLBanks need to find other revenue sources while 
banks continue to be hesitant to lend. One such source is lending to insurance and captive 
insurance companies. A captive insurance company exists to insure its parent company’s 
assets (as a form of self-insurance), and parent companies do not need to be in the 
banking or insurance sector to form captives. According to Fitch Ratings (2013), all 
twelve FHLBanks lend to insurance companies, and this lending was at year-end 2012 
less than ten percent of the total outstanding advances at all except four FHLBanks (Des 
Moines, Indianapolis, New York, and Topeka).  
Insurance company exposure at FHLBanks seems to be concentrated in the 
Midwestern (Des Moines, Indianapolis, and Topeka) and New York regions. The reason 
for this concentration is unclear. It may be due to favorable tax or regulatory treatment 
for insurance companies in these areas, geographic origins of insurance companies, or 
marketing efforts and business strategies of these four FHLBanks. Perhaps there are 
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simply more insurance companies located in these regions and so there are more 
customers to borrow from the FHLBanks. Research regarding the concentration of 
insurance company exposures at the Midwestern and the New York FHLBanks would 
complement this paper. 
Insurance companies pose threats to the FHLBank System in two primary ways. 
First, insurance company failures are very expensive, possibly because they understate 
their liabilities, which could be a function of a lack of transparency. Part of this cost 
could be put on the FHLBanks, as they may not be able to get back their advances since 
they don’t enjoy a ‘super lien’ on insurance companies. Second, captive insurance 
companies open the door to non-bank, non-insurance company customers that are 
unfamiliar to the FHLBanks.   
The FHLB System has been more involved in lending to insurance companies 
since the start of the Great Recession than at any other point since its creation in 1932. 
According to a presentation given by representatives from the Federal Home Loan Banks 
of Indianapolis and Pittsburgh to the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) in 
October of 2013, insurance companies make up 3.6 percent (273 out of 7,558) of all 
FHLBank members (Griffin and Spiker, 2013). According to FHLB Boston’s website, 
only 39 insurance companies were members of the FHLB System in 1999 and 154 were 
members in 2007. Per Griffin and Spiker (2013), insurance company membership has 
increased every year since 1999. It needs to again be pointed out that the Federal Home 
Loan Banks have had the ability to lend to insurance companies since their inception. In 
this respect, going from 39 to 273 members over the span of 15 years is significant 
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growth. This lending opens up a whole host of new risks such as the costs of failing 
insurance companies and the expansive scope of captive insurance companies.  
 
SUBSECTION 3.1: Costs of Failure 
 
As with most types of companies, failing entities can be very expensive. In this 
respect, insurance companies are no different, and in fact, research suggests insurance 
companies are more costly at failure than banks. The high costs could mean the 
FHLBanks will not recover their advances in the event of failure, as they do not enjoy a 
‘super lien’ on insurance companies. The research on failing insurance companies is 
focused on property and casualty (P&C) insurance companies, but the same principles 
can be applied to other types of insurance companies.  
 In general, if a property and casualty insurance company fails, the state will cover 
certain liabilities owned by the company. This is referred to a guarantee fund, and is 
usually financed by all the insurers in the state.3 According to Bohn and Hall (1998), 
states do not typically hold reserves for these guarantee funds and only analyze the 
potential liabilities after the insurance company has become insolvent. However, the 
price of insolvency of property and casualty insurance companies is rather large 
compared to failures of other entities. Both and Grace, Klein, and Phillips (2003) and 
Bohn and Hall (1998) assert that the failures of insurance companies cost more than the 
failures of banks.  
                                                          
3 Each claim sold by insurers contributes a certain amount (generally 1 percent-4 percent) to the guarantee 
fund. This ‘tax’ can be included in the price of claim sold. 
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Bohn and Hall (1998) determine property and casualty insurance company 
failures generally cost around 100 percent of the book value of the assets of the insurance 
company while savings and loan failures in the late 1980s generally cost only around 30 
percent of the book value of the assets of the savings and loan. Bohn and Hall (1998) 
deduce the main reason for the high cost of insurance company failures is that their 
liabilities are understated. 
Bohn and Hall (1998) point out that if this is true, then insurance company and 
bank failures are inherently different, which could account for the difference in cost. 
When banks fail, it is due to bad assets (loan defaults, etc.), but when P&C insurance 
companies fail, it may be due to understated liabilities. Bohn and Hall (1998) also assert 
that P&C companies are inherently riskier than banks because there are too many 
unknowns in insurance. For example, nobody can know when a disaster will strike. This 
principle can be extended to life insurance because when someone will die can also be 
unknown. According to Bohn and Hall (1998), the amount of unknowns only increases 
when insurance companies give out long-term policies because the future gets less and 
less certain the farther out one goes. Another point Bohn and Hall (1998) make is that 
when a bank fails, other banks may purchase the healthy assets and reduce the cost of the 
failure. However, when P&C companies fail, this does not occur and the claims are all 
paid out to the extent of the assets in the guarantee fund. Again, this logic could be 
extended to life insurers as well. 
Two potential enablers of expensive failures by insurance companies are state 
regulatory structures and a lack of transparency around the regulation. Unlike banks and 
bank holding companies, insurance companies are only regulated at the state level. Grace, 
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Klein, and Phillips (2003) claim the funding for insurance regulation departments from 
each state comes mainly from two sources, “general appropriations from the overall state 
budget or through fees and assessments imposed on the industry which flow directly to 
the department” (p.20-21). Further, Grace, Klein, and Phillips (2003), also say “state 
governments have stronger incentives to oversee the operations of an insurance 
department that receives the majority of its funds through general appropriations and does 
not have the access to additional resources” (p. 21). This could mean states do not spend 
equal portions of their budgets on this regulation, and thus, the level of regulation likely 
varies from state to state.  It could also mean that in a post-Great Recession United States 
where state budgets are continuously being slashed, insurance regulation departments are 
probably not exempt from reduced staff and resources. Ultimately, states may not have 
the resources to properly regulate all insurance and captive insurance companies if budget 
austerity continues. 
Insurance companies’ financial statements are not transparent and are often not 
available to the public. They do report such information to their state regulators, but this 
information is confidential, and neither the FHFA nor the FHLB System can access it. 
Fitch Ratings (2014) adds that the “financial statements [for insurance companies] filed 
with their state insurance regulator are not generally available to even other state 
insurance regulators.” According to Schich (2009), insurance companies do not share 
enough information with their state regulators so that insurance companies can be 
properly regulated. Grace, Klein, and Phillips (2003) and Schich (2009) advocate for 
more consistent and transparent insurance company regulation. Schich (2009) implies all 
states need sound regulatory frameworks by saying:  
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This situation [Great Recession] has also increased the need for having an 
adequate regulatory and supervisory framework in place. As contagion risk from 
unregulated or lightly regulated entities within a financial group can create risks 
and liquidity demands for the group as a whole, it is important to ensure that this 
framework is comprehensive. 
(p. 24).  
 
It is imperative that a sound regulatory structure exists for insurance companies 
and that the regulation is transparent. If insurance companies are not properly regulated 
and not made more transparent, then the FHLBank lending to these entities could be 
unknowingly creating risks. As a result, the FHFA Office of the Inspector General (OIG, 
2012) is concerned that neither the FHFA nor the FHLBanks can adequately assess how 
risky the lending is when it is made to insurance companies. 
However, not everyone agrees that increased lending to insurance companies 
poses additional risks to the FHLB System. Ed Toy, who is the Director of the Capital 
Markets Bureau at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has this 
mindset. During an interview in 2014 he said he does not believe insurance companies 
will eventually use FHLB advances in lieu of raising funds through the capital markets 
assuming the status quo stays the same. He added that insurance companies probably 
would not want to becoming heavily concentrated in one source of funding such as FHLB 
advances. This is probably true, but in the event of another financial crisis where many 
sources of liquidity dry up, it is possible that the FHLBanks could be a substantial 
funding source for insurance companies.  
According to Ed Toy (telephone interview, May 13, 2014), insurance company 
regulators are focused on asset and liability management, as well as enterprise risk. This 
means just because insurance companies have access to funds via FHLB advances; they 
will not use the funds to take excessive risks. Insurance company regulators have been 
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criticized in the academic literature for not being consistent or transparent, and Ed Toy’s 
optimism about them may be undeserved. 
 
SUBSECTION 3.2: Captive Insurance Subsidiaries 
 
There are variations between different types of insurance companies, and one 
particular type has drawn a lot of attention from the FHLBanks and its regulator: captive 
insurance companies. Captive insurance companies exist to insure the assets of their 
parents, and more captives have been using FHLB advances because they are cheaper 
than the rates in the private market. Any type of entity (as in, non-bank, non-insurance) 
can form a captive subsidiary, and so captive membership is an area of contention and is 
seen as creating risks. Fitch Ratings (2014) gives two reasons for these risks. First, there 
are different accounting standards for captives and regular insurance companies. There is 
a known lack of transparency and consistency with insurance company financials and 
regulation. These lacks of transparency and consistency are not limited to captives, but 
perhaps captives are even more mysterious in these regards. Second, captives can form in 
more than 30 states, which could cause competition between states for captives, and 
ultimately between the different FHLBanks for customers. This competition could lead to 
promises of lax regulation by the state, as well as favorable interest rates from the 
FHLBanks in exchange for membership. 
For tax mitigation purposes, captive insurance companies can take the forms of 
real estate investment trusts (REITs), which is how REITs are eligible for FHLB 
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membership.4 The captive REIT subsidiaries typically own the real estate assets of the 
parent company while their parent companies receive tax benefits. Similar to captive 
insurance subsidiaries, the parent companies of REITs do not need to be in the banking or 
insurance sector to be eligible for FHLB membership. According to Bloomberg (2014), 
Redwood Trust Inc. became the fourth REIT to join the FHLB System.  Marsh (2014), 
which describes itself as “the world’s leading insurance broker and risk adviser…” says it 
has been working with its REIT clients so that they can create captive insurance 
subsidiaries “for the purpose of accessing funding with the Federal Home Loan Bank 
system.”  
Marsh (2014) goes on to say that captives not only reduce the risks of the REIT 
because they will insure its assets, but the captives will also allow the REIT parents to 
“gain access to low-cost funding through the FHLB…” According to Marsh (2014), these 
captives are primarily forming in Michigan and Missouri to allow the subsidiaries to 
become members of FHLB Indianapolis and FHLB Des Moines, which have the largest 
percentage of insurance company advances compared to their total assets among the 
FHLBanks. 
The partnership between the FHLBanks and captive insurance subsidiaries is 
highly controversial. In fact, so controversial that six days after Redwood joined the 
FHLBank of Chicago, the FHLBanks put a self-imposed moratorium on captives 
becoming FHLB members due to criticism and pressure from their regulator. Fitch 
Ratings (2014) also gives a specific reason why Redwood’s membership is an issue: 
Redwood Trust Inc. deals in jumbo mortgages. By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
                                                          
4 A REIT is an entity that invests in real estate directly, either through properties or mortgages, and receives 
special tax considerations. 
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only allowed to purchase conforming mortgages. The FHFA sets a ceiling dollar amount 
for conforming mortgages by county, with anything above that limit being referred to as a 
jumbo mortgage. For 2015, the maximum amounts for conforming mortgages typically 
range from $417,000 to $801,950, but in more expensive counties the FHFA may allow 
up to $1.20 million (FHFA, 2015). Redwood Trust, Inc. is borrowing from the FHLBanks 
to purchase jumbo mortgages, and then selling these jumbo mortgages to other banks. 
This means that Fannie and Freddie aren’t legally allowed to spur demand for jumbo 
mortgages in the secondary market, but the FHLBanks could possibly have this power.  
Captive insurance companies have come under scrutiny from the FHFA. In 2014, 
the FHFA proposed new eligibility requirements for FHLB members, two of which are 
that captive insurance companies would be ineligible for membership and that existing 
captive members would be phased out over a five year period (Members of Federal Home 
Loan Banks, 2014). The remainder of the new requirements will be discussed later in the 
paper. This proposed rule would decrease the potential risk and scope of the FHLBanks, 
as captives would not be eligible for membership. However, industry groups and 
Congress have attacked these requirements. These attacks will also be discussed in more 
detail later in the paper. 
 
SUBSECTION 3.3: Facts and Figures 
 
 According to Griffin and Spiker (2013), advances to insurance companies made 
up 11.7 percent ($55 billion out of $471 billion) of all outstanding FHLB advances as of 
June 30, 2013. From 1999-2006, advances to insurance companies never exceeded $15 
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billion. However, in 2007, they shot up to almost $30 billion. Then in 2008 they rose as 
high as roughly $55 billion. Since 2008, advances to insurance companies have not 
dropped below $45 billion, and have gone up every year since 2010.  
Griffin and Spiker’s (2013) presentation also provided a breakout of the largest 
insurance company borrowers (in terms of asset size) from the FHLBanks. The three 
largest were MetLife ($361 billion in total assets), Prudential ($285 billion in total 
assets), and John Hancock ($227 billion in total assets). The FHLBanks are broken up by 
regional district, and of the top ten largest insurance company borrowers, four were in the 
New York district, three were in Indianapolis, two were in Boston, and one was in Dallas.  
These data show that lending to insurance companies is becoming a bigger part of 
the FHLBanks’ lines of business. Both membership and advances have gone up 
significantly since 1999. It is also telling that the FHLBanks are going out to insurance 
company groups to market the benefits of advances. This suggests the FHLBanks want to 
continue to grow this customer base.  
A report by Fitch Ratings (2013) shows that FHLB lending to insurance 
companies rose 91 percent from 2007 to 2008. This is a quite a large jump, though not 
surprising given that it was during the Great Recession and insurance companies badly 
needed liquidity. Bank borrowing from the FHLB System followed a similar pattern 
because so many sources of funding dried up. Liquidity traps are common in financial 
crises, and the FHLB System may be used again for the same purpose in the future for 
both banks and insurance companies. 
Fitch Ratings (2013) goes on to report that of the 17 largest FHLB borrowers that 
are insurance companies, only one was not a life insurance company at year-end 2012.  
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This happens because life insurance companies need longer-duration assets to combat 
their cash flow characteristics. This concentration in one or two insurance company 
sectors could create systemic market risk if those sectors experience a crisis. Further, 11.7 
percent of the members of FHLB Indianapolis were insurance companies at the end of 
2012. FHLB Boston was second with 6.0 percent. The following table highlights the 




TABLE 1: Insurance Company Concentration 
Insurance Company Type Percentage of FHLB Insurance 
Members 
Life  58 percent 
Property and Casualty 39 percent 




Fitch Ratings (2013) estimates 14 percent of all life insurance companies and 3 
percent of all P&C insurance companies in the U.S. are FHLB members. Again, this 
concentration in life and P&C insurance companies could have negative effects if things 
deteriorate in those market sectors. 
It should be noted that Fitch Ratings (2013) does say that since the financial crisis 
FHLB membership has gone up for insurance companies, but the aggregate amount of 
borrowings has gone down $3.3 billion since the end of 2008. However, this means the 
insurance borrowers relied on FHLB advances once, and will likely not hesitate to rely on 
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them again if liquidity becomes scarce. FHLBanks do not allow members to borrow more 
than 20-55 percent of their total assets. While this rule does somewhat mitigate excessive 
borrowing, 55 percent of a large insurance company is likely significant enough to create 
risk.  
According to Fitch Ratings (2013), FHLB lending to insurance companies seem 




TABLE 2: FHLBank Insurance Lending 
Federal Home Loan Bank Advances/Line of Credit to 
Insurance Companies 
Percent of Total Advances 
Des Moines $15.2 billion 58.5 percent 
Indianapolis $8.4 billion 48.6 percent 
New York $17.2 billion 23.8 percent 




Over half of all outstanding advances (or available lines of credit) belong to 
insurance companies at FHLB Des Moines, and roughly half belong to insurance 
companies at FHLB Indianapolis. If these insurance companies run into financial trouble 
and cannot repay the FHLBanks, FHLB Indianapolis and FHLB Des Moines could 
experience significant losses.  
Fitch Ratings (2013) does point out that insurance companies have more funding 
agreements than borrowings. This means so far insurance companies have the ability to 
borrow more than they have actually borrowed. However, when these lines of credit are 
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drawn they will become liabilities for the FHLBanks. MetLife had nearly $14 billion 
outstanding with FHLB New York as of December 31, 2012, which was 18.7 percent of 
FHLB New York’s total advances, and 3.3 percent of all FHLBanks’ advances. This is a 
staggering number as the default of one customer could cause serious problems for FHLB 
New York. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K reports reveal that not only 
have insurance companies been taking out more advances, they are supplanting banks as 
top borrowers at some of the FHLBanks. Insurance companies made up one of the top ten 
borrowers from the FHLBanks of Indianapolis and New York at the end of 2006, but 
made up five at year-end 2013. The majority of this gain happened at the FHLBank of 
Indianapolis. Even though FHLB New York only went from having zero to one in its top 
five borrowers, that one made up 14.4 percent of its total advances. The following table 
breaks out the number of insurance companies in four of the FHLBanks’ top five 





TABLE 3: Top Five Borrowers 
Federal Home Loan Bank 2006 2013 
Indianapolis 1 4 
Des Moines 3 3 
Topeka 2 2 
New York 0 1 
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 The Federal Home Loan Bank of Indianapolis saw an insurance company rise to 
become its largest lender at year-end 2013. At year-end 2006, the largest insurance 
company ranked fifth at FHLB Indianapolis. Even though one was ranked fifth in 2006 at 
FHLB Indianapolis, it only had 2.7 percent of all outstanding balances that FHLBank. By 
year-end 2013 this exposure almost quadrupled, with the balance representing 12 percent 
of all outstanding advances. This is a major jump in terms of balance sheet composition.   
The data about advances to insurance companies is telling because it could signify 
a potential large-scale shift (at least in the short run) in FHLB business activity because 
advances to insurance companies have been growing for quite some time. Right now 
banks have so much excess liquidity that they do not need to take out as much in FHLB 
advances. This may not change over the next several years and the FHLBanks will need 
to earn interest income somehow. Lending to insurance companies could possibly fill 
some of that revenue void.  
Although right now life insurance companies are bigger borrowers from the 
FHLBanks, lending to property and casualty insurance companies could continue to grow 
over the next several years. Property and casualty does not always include coverage for 
water damage, flooding, and natural disasters, but these types of insurers will generally 
offer these types of coverage in addition to property and casualty insurance. Since money 
is fungible,5 some of the funds lent to property and casualty insurance companies will 
undoubtedly go towards funding water damage, flooding, and natural disaster coverage. 
Floods and large-scale natural disasters have been coming at more frequent levels than in 
                                                          
5 Fungible in finance means funds borrowed for a specific purpose (issuing mortgages, etc.) can be used to 
fulfill other purposes (maanging cash flow, etc.), and there is no way to track the exact purpose once the 
borrower has the funds. 
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the past and if climate change is the cause of this increased frequency, then these types of 
activities will likely continue at a higher frequency for the foreseeable future. It is 
conceivable that property and casualty insurance companies could rival life insurance 
companies as the FHLBanks’ biggest insurance customers in coming years. 
It is evident that insurance companies are becoming a bigger part of FHLBanks’ 
membership and balance sheets. Although it’s possible lending to insurance companies 
will wane in the long run, it is growing in the short run. Growth seems to be relatively 
concentrated in life insurance companies located in the Federal Home Loan Bank districts 
of New York, Indianapolis, Topeka and Des Moines, but property and casualty insurance 
companies could be in need of advances as a result of increased natural disaster activity. 
Insurance company advisors are even suggesting companies open up captive subsidiaries 
in two of these regions, which will only exacerbate the concentration risk. Lending to 
insurance companies went from a fledgling operation to a noteworthy business function 
during the Great Recession. While the economy remains mired in its current abeyant 
state, lending to insurance companies is likely to grow as these entities want cheap funds 
and banks continue to not need FHLBank advances. 
   
CHAPTER 4: THE MPF PROGRAMS 
 
Since 1932, the primary business of the FHLBanks has been to earn interest from 
advances to member banks. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, most FHLBanks added 
some kind of mortgage purchasing program (MPF, etc.) to this model, but the primary 
income still came from interest associated with advances to member banks. However, so 
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long as banks continue to not rely on FHLBank advances following the Great Recession, 
these mortgage purchase programs may play a larger role in the FHLBanks’ revenue 
stream. The FHLBanks earn revenue from these programs by purchasing mortgages 
directly from banks and earning the interest and fees directly from borrowers, or by 
selling the mortgages to MBS issuers such as Fannie Mae. 
In 1997, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago created the original MPF 
Program, which is a mortgage purchase program. The primary reason for the original 
MPF Program, according to both Eric Schambow (telephone interview, November 5, 
2013), who is the current Senior Vice President of the MPF Program, and Alex Pollock 
(telephone interview, October 21, 2013), who is currently a Senior Fellow at the 
American Enterprise Institute and created the original MPF Program during his tenure as 
CEO of FHLB Chicago (1991-2004), was that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not (and 
still do not) have an incentive to purchase loans from small banks. This happens because 
due diligence is more costly on some of the mortgages issued by small banks. In addition, 
some of these mortgages have unusual characteristics.  
Ron Haynie (telephone interview, May 17, 2014), who is the Senior Vice 
President of Mortgage Finance Policy for the Independent Community Bankers 
Association (ICBA) and previously worked for Freddie Mac, echoed this point when he 
told me that Fannie and Freddie do not even provide representative service to many small 
community banks and credit unions. He went on to say these entities have to call a 1-800 
number to have any questions answered or to talk to Fannie and Freddie. So, in essence, 
small banks had few (if any) outlets to sell these mortgages before the original MPF 
Program. This ‘discrimination’ did not give small banks easy access to the secondary 
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mortgage market. In contrast, the FHLBanks are regional in focus and provide small 
community banks and credit unions with better customer service and attention. The 
FHLBanks deal with these small banks on a daily basis and have the personnel and 
wherewithal to apply due diligence to small or unusual loans.  
The 2007 Combined Financial Report of the Federal Home Loan Banks lists 
seven FHLBanks (Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Des Moines, New York, Pittsburgh, and 
Topeka) that were involved in the original MPF program, and all the FHLBanks on that 
list except Dallas have participated in the MPF Xtra program since it debuted in 2008. 
The FHLBanks of Cincinnati and Indianapolis do not participate in the MPF programs, 
but instead have their own mortgage purchase programs (MPPs).6 In 2013 and 2014, the 
FHLBanks of San Francisco, Atlanta, and Seattle joined the MPF and MPF Xtra 
programs, and FHLB Dallas joined the MPF Xtra program. The FHLBank of San 
Francisco participated in the original MPF program from 2001-2006 (Federal Home Loan 
Bank of San Francisco, 2013), and it possibly left the program due to mounting concerns 
over potential losses associated with defaulting mortgages.  
It is unclear why some FHLBanks did not participate in either the MPF or MPP 
programs before the Great Recession. Perhaps those who abstained did not wish to get 
involved in the secondary mortgage market, or did not have the systems and controls in 
place to participate in these programs. Some of these abstainers may have planned to join, 
but were dissuaded by the losses due to defaulting mortgages incurred by participating 
FHLBanks and other private entities immediately preceding and during the Great 
                                                          
6 The MPPs of the FHLBanks of Cincinnati and Indianapolis are not a focus of this paper and will not be 
discussed in detail. 
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Recession. Research concerning the management practices of the FHLBanks would also 
complement this paper. 
In general, banks like to sell mortgages after origination so that they do not have 
to tie up their funds until the mortgage is periodically repaid. Also, selling the mortgages 
serves as a hedge against interest rate risk. This means that if interest rates suddenly rise 
then banks may have to pay more interest on their deposits than they are making on 
fixed-rate loans. The original MPF Program allows the Federal Home Loan Banks to 
purchase mortgages while the selling banks can keep the relationship with their clients as 
they will typically still service the loans.7  In addition, the original MPF Program forces 
banks to keep a portion of the credit risk (or risk the borrower will not repay) so that 
these lenders have skin in the game even when selling the mortgages. 
In the summer of 2008, a few months before the lowest points of the Great 
Recession, the FHLB System unveiled the MPF Xtra Program.  This program is 
essentially the same as the original MPF Program with one major difference: under the 
MPF Xtra Program, banks are no longer required to keep a portion of the credit risk, and 
thus have less of an incentive to make sound loans. Such practices are cited as part of the 
cause of the Great Recession, as banks could sell loans to Fannie and Freddie while 
facing little (if any) recourse if borrowers defaulted and stopped making payments. This 
opens to the door to moral hazard as mortgage originators know that because they can 
immediately sell the mortgages without retaining any portion of the credit risk, the 
originators have less of an incentive to issue sound mortgages. This happens because 
once the mortgage is sold; it is unlikely (only through representation and warranty issues) 
                                                          
7 Servicing rights include collecting the payments, directly dealing with the borrowers, and performing 
other administrative tasks. These rights are sometimes sold to private third parties, Fannie, or Freddie. 
  26 
 
that the originator realize any losses in the event default. Hence, banks had little incentive 
to issue sound loans because they could sell them immediately. 
Eric Schambow (telephone interview, November 5, 2013) was adamant that the 
Great Recession had nothing to do with the timing of the MPF Xtra Program. According 
to Eric Schambow (telephone interview, November 5, 2013), the FHLBanks had been 
trying since around 2005 or 2006 to offer the MPF Xtra Program but the FHFB, then 
regulator of the FHLB System, would not allow the FHLBanks to be involved in such a 
practice. Eventually the FHLBanks were able to convince the FHFB to allow this practice 
and so the MPF Xtra Program began right before the heart of the crisis, but the MPF Xtra 
Program was not authorized as a result of any crisis thinking. 
The primary reason for the MPF Xtra Program, according to Eric Schambow 
(telephone interview, November 5, 2013), was that the FHFB put a cap on how large the 
FHLBanks’ asset portfolios could become. Under the original MPF Program, each 
FHLBank would purchase mortgages from the bank and keep them in its own portfolio. 
However, the FHLBanks were accumulating assets to the point where they could no 
longer legally purchase any more loans. The MPF Xtra Program allowed the FHLBanks 
to sell the loans to Fannie Mae and thus, be off the books of the FHLBanks. By law, the 
FHLBanks cannot securitize mortgages and so they need to sell loans to entities that are 
legally allowed to do so in order to further spur demand the secondary mortgage market. 
Thus, the MPF Xtra Program was a perfect fit because it allowed the FHLBanks to offer 
their member institutions access to the secondary mortgage market and it provided Fannie 
Mae more mortgages to securitize.  
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The MPF Xtra Program, however, is not without its critics. Brent Ambrose, who 
holds a Ph.D. in real estate and is a current professor at Penn State University, is one such 
critic. Brent Ambrose (telephone interview, October 11, 2013) is very much concerned 
with the FHLB System’s MPF Xtra Program as the FHLB System likely lacks sufficient 
oversight and so he is not convinced the FHFA has been properly keeping an eye on this 
product. He also does not buy the argument made by some community banks that have 
said they prefer dealing with the FHLB System in terms of selling mortgages (as opposed 
to Fannie and Freddie) because the System better understands their needs due to the 
regional jurisdiction of the 12 FHLBanks. According to Brent Ambrose (telephone 
interview, October 11, 2013), banks will seek out the best price, and would only prefer to 
sell to the FHLBanks if they could not be forced to buy back loans that default due to 
representation and warranty issues.8  
Professor of banking, finance, and real estate at U.C. Berkeley, Dwight Jaffee, 
who has written about GSEs for the National Bureau of Economic Research, also shares 
Brent Ambrose’s concerns over the MPF Programs (both original and Xtra). He takes this 
position because if the MPF Programs continue to grow, the FHLB System could 
eventually become a new version of Fannie and Freddie. Having been a long-standing 
critic against Fannie and Freddie purchasing loans for investment, Dwight Jaffee 
(telephone interview, October 10, 2013) does not believe the FHLBanks should be 
involved in this practice either because they were not created to do so. FHLBanks should 
not look like investment banks; they should be there to make loans to banks so that the 
                                                          
8 If the selling bank is proven to have not provided proper documentation or correct information such as the 
borrower’s credit score, it may have to repurchase the loan from Fannie and Freddie in the event of default.  
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banks can issue mortgages. Merely transferring all the risks associated with mortgages 
from banks to GSEs was not the original intent of the GSEs and does not serve a public 
policy purpose. 
Unlike Brent Ambrose and Dwight Jaffee, Fred Graham (personal 
communication, October 24, 2013) at the FHFA prefers the MPF Xtra Program to the 
original MPF Program because it gets the mortgages off the FHLBanks’ books. While 
this is true, it is just transferring risk to Fannie Mae and does not require originating 
banks to share a portion of the credit risk. This may not have mattered before 2008 
because both the FHLB System and Fannie Mae were operating as GSEs. However, since 
Fannie has been in conservatorship, American taxpayers will be responsible for any 
losses. 
According to the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago (2013), the MPF Program 
doubled in size from December of 2011 to December of 2012. In 2012, the overall MPF 
Program purchased roughly $14 billion in mortgages and $7 billion of that was from the 
MPF Xtra Program, which increased $5 billion. Even Eric Schambow (telephone 
interview, November 5, 2013) admitted that the MPF Xtra Program took off faster than 
he and his colleagues had anticipated. Also, the FHLB of Chicago is currently in talks 
with Freddie Mac and other private label securitization firms to get involved in the MPF 
Xtra Program. If successful, the FHLBanks could become bigger players in the secondary 
mortgage market, as they would directly feed a greater amount of mortgages into it.  
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SUBSECTION 4.1: The MPF Program and Ginnie Mae 
 
Recently, the FHLBanks have gotten involved in a different way of bolstering the 
housing market. In September of 2013, Ginnie Mae put out a press release announcing 
that the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago will be able to issue Ginnie Mae MBS. 
This product is called ‘MPF Government Mortgage-Backed Securities’, and could break 
down the barrier between the FHLBanks and issuing their own MBS. 
It is important to point out some of the nuances of these MBS. Ginnie Mae is a 
government corporation, and so Ginnie Mae MBS are fully guaranteed (explicitly) by the 
United States government. Also, only mortgages insured or guaranteed by the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), the Department Veterans Affairs, and the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA, for rural development) can make up Ginnie Mae MBS. MBS issued 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be composed of mortgages issued by any parties, so 
long as they meet conforming standards.  One final difference is that Ginnie Mae does 
not actually issue the securities. Lending institutions work with Ginnie Mae staff to make 
sure all the underlying mortgages meet Ginnie Mae standards. If they all meet these 
standards, then Ginnie Mae puts a stamp of approval on the MBS but the lending 
institution actually issues it. In other MBS issuances, the mortgages are sold by the 
lending institution to a third party (Fannie, Freddie, etc.), and then that third party issues 
the security. 
This product is important for one primary reason: FHLBanks are not authorized to 
issue MBS of their own. That is, they are not allowed to package the mortgages 
purchased from the MPF Programs into MBS. In 2009, the FHFA denied the FHLBanks’ 
  30 
 
request to be able to issue MBS because it created too much systemic risk. This likely 
was due to the fact that Fannie and Freddie had needed a bailout less than a year before. 
The fact that the FHLBank of Chicago can now issue Ginnie Mae MBS could be the 
toehold the FHLBanks have been looking for in terms of a first step towards being able to 
issue their own MBS.   
Ron Haynie (telephone interview, May 17, 2014) thinks the FHLBanks should be 
allowed to issue their own MBS but only if that service was completely segregated from 
normal FHLBank activity. He said issuing MBS would help FHLBank members manage 
risk (interest rate, credit, etc.). However, he added, what happened to Fannie and Freddie 
could happen again and so the FHLBanks would have to find a way to not expose the 
whole FHLB System in the event of MBS defaults.  
 However, Ron Haynie (telephone interview, May 17, 2014) did caveat this by 
saying small banks do not want to see the FHLBanks get too involved in the secondary 
mortgage market because that is only a secondary service they offer. The FHLBanks’ 
primary service is issuing loans to banks so that the banks can issue mortgages. The fear 
is that eventually the FHLBanks will start to care only about larger mortgages. Some 
FHLBanks have been criticized for having too many advances outstanding with a handful 
of large customers and the same thing could happen with their MPF Programs. 
 




SUBSECTION 4.2: MPF Program Dollar Figures 
 
According to the 2007 FHLB Combined Financial Report, the Federal Home 
Loan Banks held a total of $67 billion of MPF loans held their portfolios at year-end 
2007 and $73 billion at year-end 2006. According to 2011 Securities Exchange SEC 
reports, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, where the MPF Programs started, held 
$18.3 billion in MPF loans in its portfolio at year-end 2010 and $23.8 billion at year-end 
2009. Also, it sold $3.4 billion worth of MPF Xtra loans in 2010. 
According to 2013 SEC reports, FHLB Chicago’s mortgage portfolio has been 
declining because it has not been acquiring MPF mortgages for its portfolio. By the end 
of 2013, this balance had dropped to $7.7 billion. $6.9 billion worth of MPF Xtra loans 
were sold in 2012 and $4.7 billion were sold in 2013, with activity at FHLB Chicago 
making up almost half of these balances. However, three FHLBanks joined the program 
in 2013, which could revitalize activity. 
As indicated in a 2013 SEC report, FHLB Topeka had $1.2 billion of MPF loans 
in its portfolio at year-end 2011 and $1.4 billion at year-end 2012. Also, although MPF 
Xtra loans sold from the Topeka district to FHLB Chicago were only $178 million in 
2013, FHLB Topeka expects a higher volume of sales in 2014. The table below breaks 
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TABLE 4: Des Moines MPF Activity 2011-2013 
Year Original MPF Purchases MPF Xtra sold to FHLB 
Chicago 
2011 $1.4 billion $600 million 
2012 $2.1 billion $2.0 billion 




The following table summarizes Original MPF and MPF Xtra activity for the 




TABLE 5: FHLB System MPF Activity 2011-2013 
Year Original MPF Program MPF Xtra Program 
2011 $6.99 billion $2.81 billion 
2012 $14.33 billion $6.94 billion 




According to the Mortgage Partnership Finance (2014), the MPF Program funded 
almost 56,000 loans totaling roughly $9 billion in 2013. Almost half of these loans came 
from the MPF Xtra Program. At the end of 2013 there were 832 MPF participants, and 
773 (92.9 percent) of them had less than $1.095 billion in total assets. The MPF Programs 
have been providing an outlet in the secondary market for these small banks. It is 
surprising that over 90 percent of banks and credit unions involved have less than $1.095 
billion, but it does underline the importance and potential growth of the MPF Programs 
for small banks and credit unions.   
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According to the FHFA OIG (2014), the MPF Xtra program represented 20 
percent (roughly $14.2 billion) of FHLB Chicago’s business in 2013, which grew from 
both 2012 (18 percent) and 2011 (12 percent).  However, the MPF Xtra Program only 
makes up 1-2 percent of Fannie Mae’s total single-family loan purchases. The FHFA 
OIG does not feel that either one of these values is large enough to present anything but 
minimal risk to both FHLB Chicago and Fannie Mae. 
It is evident that the MPF Programs are growing and becoming a larger part of the 
FHLBanks’ business in the wake of the Great Recession. Although products can come 
and go depending on customer demand, the MPF Programs are directly in line with the 
FHLBanks’ primary mission and so they are likely to remain relevant even if they 
experience long-run declines. This growth in these programs could be troublesome if the 
FHFA does not keep a close eye on the Programs because one of the main causes of the 
Great Recession was lending to customers with questionable credit. The MPF and MPF 
Xtra Programs provide an outlet for small banks and credit unions into the secondary 
mortgage market that they might not have if only Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac existed. 
However, this outlet may come at a price as these programs may lead the FHLBanks 
down similar paths as Fannie and Freddie.  
 
CHAPTER 5: MERGER AND MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS 
 
Aside from lending to insurance companies and the growth of the MPF Programs, 
there are other changes looming for the FHLB System. These changes include a merger 
between two FHLBanks and proposed, restrictive eligibility requirements. This 
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unprecedented merger could lead to more mergers and significantly alter the future FHLB 
System. Some have criticized the FHLBanks because the Banks can be seen as cheap 
liquidity sources for members. These critics claim that because the FHLB System is a 
GSE, there is an implicit guarantee on their debt. Some of these same critics have called 
for the FHLBanks to become stricter with their membership requirements to lessen the 
potential for future taxpayer bailouts. The FHFA has listened and proposed new 
membership requirements as a result. These new requirements are stricter than the old 
requirements, and industry groups, some members of Congress, and some of the 
FHLBanks presidents have opposed them. The proposed membership requirements could 
create path dependency with increasing returns for the FHLBanks.  According to Pierson 
(2000), path dependency can be thought of as “…preceding steps in a particular direction 
[that] induce further movement in the same direction” (p. 252). 
Interconnectedness is another frequently cited cause of the Great Recession. The 
bailout of the American International Group (AIG) was not given due to the size of AIG 
itself, but rather because AIG was so connected to other major players in the financial 
sector. Put another way, the failure of AIG likely would likely have resulted in the failure 
of other significant members of the financial sector. The FHFA is undoubtedly aware of 
the importance of interconnectedness, and probably does not want to see the FHLBanks 
become entwined with too many sectors beyond banking and insurance and too many 
purposes other than increasing home ownership. If the FHLB System does become too 
interconnected with too many different counterparties in different sectors, then it may 
wreak havoc across a myriad of sectors if it experiences financial trouble. 
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SUBSECTION 5.1: Merger 
 
In 2014, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank of Des Moines ratified the terms for a merger set to take place sometime during 
mid-2015. The merging of two Home Loan Banks is unprecedented, and the fact that a 
merger negotiation was even being discussed is big news in itself. According to an 
American Banker (2014) article, if either party had backed out before June 30, 2015, it 
would have had to pay the other $57 million. If two Home Loan Banks merge, it’s 
possible that others will merge as well. Two different FHLBanks tried to merge in 2007, 
but ultimately that merger fell apart after the two sides could not agree on a fair market 
price.  
The Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle has been in financial trouble for almost a 
decade. The trouble has come from two primary sources. First, during the mid-00s, it 
invested heavily in private-label MBS, which are MBS issued by companies without an 
explicit or implicit government guarantee (not issued by Ginnie, Fannie, or Freddie). 
During the Great Recession it became clear that large amounts of MBS proved to be 
comprised of low quality, high-risk mortgages, and those without an explicit or implicit 
government guarantee left holders with no recourse except to incur financial losses. 
According to a Seattle Times article (2009); FHLB Seattle had almost 10 percent of its 
total assets in private-label MBS in March of 2008. The default of the underlying 
mortgages of these MBS resulted in hundreds of millions in losses. Second, Washington 
Mutual (aka WaMu), FHLB Seattle’s biggest customer, became insolvent and was sold to 
JP Morgan Chase in 2008. This sale took it out Seattle’s geographic district, and so it 
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would no longer borrow from FHLB Seattle.  Both of these factors combined to put 
significant financial strain on FHLB Seattle, and so the merger was likely its best option. 
One could argue the FHFA should have allowed FHLB Seattle to fail. The 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury have been criticized by many for bailing out failing 
financial firms and not forcing these failing companies to close their doors when market 
forces have lead them to bankruptcy. One could argue the same criticism should be 
directed towards the FHFA for allowing the FHLB Seattle to be acquired. FHLB Seattle 
management clearly miscalculated its exposures and had been in financial trouble for 
almost a decade. The situation is different from a failing private firm because while 
FHLB Seattle has taken losses, it never defaulted on its debt, and the joint and severally 
liable nature of FHLB debt also serves as a security blanket. However, the merger may 
encourage more moral hazard by other FHLBanks in the future, as they know it is 
unlikely they will be allowed to fail. 
The motivation for FHLB Des Moines is less clear, but two possible catalysts are 
increased efficiency and increased power. In terms increased efficiency, now FHLB Des 
Moines can better streamline its operations, as it will have more capital and resources. 
Perhaps a more streamlined FHLB Des Moines can charge less interest on its loans and 
entice members from other districts to relocate. In terms of power, FHLB Des Moines 
will now have a presence in 13 states and have by far the largest geographic region of any 
other FHLBank. This range could change the way the other FHLBanks and the members 
of those FHLBanks see FHLB Des Moines. Perhaps FHLB Des Moines will get more 
FHLBank allies, or perhaps the merger will create more FHLBank enemies. It is unlikely 
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the relationship will remain unchanged between the 10 other FHLBanks and FHLB Des 
Moines following the merger. 
 Now that two FHLBanks have merged, then some will undoubtedly raise the 
question as to whether other FHLBanks should merge. Even though nothing operationally 
will likely change as a result of the merger (other than the surviving FHLBank possibly 
being more efficient), it does raise questions of institutional dynamics. One argument for 
having 12 regional banks instead of one headquarters with branches is that each 
FHLBank better understands the needs and sentiments of the banks and insurance 
companies in its geographic region. Typically this argument is made on behalf of smaller 
banks and insurance companies. As previously mentioned, small banks prefer dealing 
with the FHLBanks to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. There could be a domino effect 
where several others merge, possibly getting eventually down to only a handful of 
FHLBanks. If this handful of FHLBanks begins to act like Fannie and Freddie and loses 
interest in smaller banks, then these smaller banks would feel detrimental effects, as they 
may need to find other, likely more expensive, liquidity providers.  
 Another argument for having 12 regional banks instead of one large FHLBank is 
that the regional banks spread out the risks associated with banking. Although the 
FHLBanks are joint and severally liable for each other’s debt, meaning if one FHLBank 
defaults on its debt payments the others must honor the debt, there hasn’t been any 
evidence this coverage has ever had to occur. During the Great Recession, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac received bailouts from the U.S. Treasury as they were about to fail, and 
the FHLBanks could require similar treatment if they consolidate to too few entities. In 
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addition, one large FHLBank would likely be another ‘too big to fail’ institution, and the 
government is trying to get away from those types of entities. 
Even before this merger was announced, there was talk of reducing the number of 
FHLBanks. During a Congressional Hearing in October of 2011, Timothy Zimmerman, 
speaking on behalf of the ICBA, was asked whether there should be fewer FHLBanks. 
Zimmerman (2011) did not agree there should be any FHLBank consolidation. According 
to Zimmerman (2011), the 12 banks allow the FHLBanks to better understand the 
member banks in their district and thus, better cater to their needs. Without this 
relationship and understanding, the FHLBanks would look more like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac where banks would get one-size fits all lenders. In addition, the 12-bank 
structure helps to spread risk throughout the country.  
Some in the industry, however, feel a merger, possibly more than one, would be 
beneficial for the FHLB System. Thad Woodard, who was the president and chief 
executive of the North Carolina Bankers Association from 1978 until he retired at the end 
of 2014, wrote an op-ed in American Banker regarding reforming the FHLB System. His 
main is point is to reform the FHLB System by reducing the FHLBanks “to a smaller, 
well-functioned few.” According to Woodard (2014), this would lower the operating 
costs of the FHLBanks because there would be fewer employees. He also points out that 
reducing the number of FHLBanks would mitigate geographically concentrated risk. 
Under the current format, if one of the FHLBanks starts to show financial stress, that 
whole geographic area is at risk because all the members of that FHLBank are located in 
the same region. Under Woodard’s format, the FHLB System would be operationally 
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streamlined and less geographically concentrated simply because there would be fewer 
FHLBanks. The dichotomy between Woodard’s stance and Zimmerman’s stance on the 
FHLBanks’ geographic risk highlights the disagreement in the industry. 
 
SUBSECTION 5.2: Proposed Membership Requirements 
 
The FHLB System is a cooperative entity, which means its members are also its 
owners. This happens because new members are required to purchase FHLB stock and 
current members must maintain FHLB stock levels proportional to their advances. The 
membership requirements have been tweaked over time, but in September of 2014 they 
received some major proposed revisions.  
The FHFA proposed new eligibility requirements for FHLB members. If adopted, 
the following relevant changes to membership would be put in place (Members of 
Federal Home Loan Banks, 2014): members with less than $1 billion in total assets 
would need to hold one percent of their total assets in home mortgage loans9 on an on-
going, as opposed to a one-time, basis, and members with more than $1 billion in total 
assets would need to hold ten percent of their total assets in residential mortgage loans10 
on an on-going, as opposed to a one-time, basis. There were also two requirements 
regarding captive subsidiaries that were mentioned earlier in the paper.  
 The proposed membership requirements are important because under the current 
rules smaller, potential members need to have one percent of their assets in home 
                                                          
9 Certain mortgage-related assets also qualify as ‘home mortgage loans’. 
10 Certain mortgage-related assets also qualify as ‘residential mortgage loans’. 
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mortgage loans and larger ones need ten percent in residential mortgage loans to be 
accepted as members. However, after the members are accepted, they are not required to 
continue to hold these percentages of home or residential mortgage loans. Critics say this 
goes against the FHLB System’s purpose, which is to provide members with liquidity so 
that these members can in turn issue more mortgages to increase home ownership. The 
FHFA appears to want the FHLBanks to be more in line with this purpose by requiring 
(through backwards means) that banks actually use the funds to issue mortgages or 
purchase mortgage-related assets (this would encourage other financial firms to issue 
mortgages and package them into mortgage-related products). The FHLBanks have 
received criticism saying members are not using their advances for issuing mortgages but 
instead using them for general liquidity purposes. These two proposed requirements 
would alleviate some of that criticism, and would better align FHLB membership with 
the System’s mission to promote home ownership. The fact that even current members 
would have to keep the necessary level home and residential mortgage assets from the 
first day they join going forward means that these members will have to issue more 
mortgages or purchase mortgage-related assets, which will directly increase home 
ownership levels.  
However, not everyone is supportive of the proposed membership requirements, 
as numerous industry groups have publicly spoken out against them. The National 
Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU, 2015) opposes the requirements because 
it says over one million credit unions would not be eligible for FHLB membership under 
the new proposed rules. Further, according to NAFCU (2015), FHLB membership should 
not be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model. The Credit Union National Association (CUNA, 2015) 
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also sent a letter to the FHFA urging them to withdraw the proposed requirements. The 
letter cites three primary reasons. First, it would require credit unions to change their 
business practices to make sure they kept the minimum requirements. Second, mortgage 
rates will go up because the FHLBanks provide low-cost liquidity to banks so that they 
can issue low-cost mortgages. If credit unions are restricted from using these advances, 
then they will have to raise funds through the private market, which will be more 
expensive to credit unions.  Ultimately, credit unions will pass the costs through to 
consumers in the form of higher interest rates on loans. Third, it could deter credit union 
mergers because the entity after the merger (if it has more than $1 billion in total assets) 
will have to hold ten percent of its total assets in residential mortgage-related assets, 
which many credit unions will not be able to do.  
At least one industry group doesn’t want to see restricted membership, and goes 
as far to say membership should actually be expanded. The Mortgage Banking 
Association (MBA) is an industry group organization that is understandably concerned 
with the future of the FHLB System. Many of its members are likely also members of the 
FHLB System, and the FHLB’s policies on issues such as membership and advance 
limits can have a major effect on many of these members. David Stevens, who is the 
CEO of the MBA, discussed FHLB membership in his testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in October of 2013: 
MBA believes serious consideration should be given to expanding Federal Home 
Loan Bank membership eligibility to include access for non-depository mortgage 
lenders. In fact, historical evidence shows that such a move is consistent with the 
original intent of the system (see Snowden, 2013). These lenders are often 
smaller, community-based independent mortgage bankers focused on providing 
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mainstream mortgage products to consumers. In exchange for membership in the 
FHLB system, these institutions could be required to hold a limited class of stock 
with appropriate restrictions. Expanding FHLB access to these institutions would 
enhance market liquidity and ensure a broader range of mortgage options for 
consumers. (p. 108). 
 
 Due to his position as CEO of the MBA, it is understandable why he would want 
FHLB membership expanded. If more entities were able to join the FHLB System, then 
there would be more opportunity for non-bank, non-insurance real estate finance 
companies to gain access to low-cost FHLB advances. This does, however, open up more 
risks to the FHLBanks, as they would need to become familiar with different entity types. 
Industry groups are not alone in their opposition to the proposed membership 
requirements as a regulator, some members of Congress, and some FHLBank presidents 
have also joined the fight. According to an American Banker (2015) article, John Ryan, 
who is the chief executive of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, said the proposal 
‘would have a detrimental effect on FHLB members and the FHLB System as a whole.’ 
National Mortgage News (2014) also had an article stating that more than 24 Senators 
sent a letter to the FHFA to drop the proposed requirements. The letter says the new 
proposed requirements are inconsistent with the FHLBank Act, and that Congress should 
be consulted before these types of decisions are made.  
Presidents of the FHLBanks of Topeka and Dallas also oppose the proposed rules, 
but provide a different reason for denouncing it. According to an American Banker 
(2015) article, these two presidents believe that Congress has implicitly expanded the 
mission of the FHLBanks beyond that of promoting home ownership, but also to 
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providing liquidity to members. This is an interesting point because since the late 1980s, 
Congress has expanded FHLBank membership to several different types of entities 
(commercial banks, community development organizations, etc.). However, there haven’t 
been any explicit changes in the FHLBanks’ mission to add providing liquidity to their 
members as a goal.  
Some critics of the FHLB System are concerned that the FHLBanks have merely 
become another liquidity source to banks. This cheaper liquidity from the FHLBanks’ 
GSE status allows members to take out fewer amounts of more expensive debt, and 
provides members with a quick and reliable liquidity source. Some argue this quickness 
and reliability increase risk as the members know that if they need funds right away to 
cover a risky transaction, the FHLBanks would be there to fill that void. 
One question is whether the industry groups and critics of proposed requirements 
are justified in their disdain. Perhaps the FHLBanks should exist to serve their mission in 
promoting home ownership, and until that mission is explicitly changed, it shouldn’t exist 
just to provide liquidity to members. Allow institutions to borrow cheap FHLB advances 
so that they can issue mortgages, but make them go to the private market for general 
liquidity funding, because that funding will be more expensive and won’t always be there 
to bail them out if they get into a liquidity trap. It appears industry groups, some 
lawmakers, and some FHLBank presidents want to keep the status quo because it allows 
banks to get access to cheaper funds to use for general liquidity purposes. However, this 
is not the mission of the FHLBanks, and it could encourage risk taking by banks and 
insurance companies. 
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These proposed requirements leave the FHLBanks at a critical juncture of path 
dependency with increasing returns. According to Pierson (2000), “In an increasing 
returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increase with each 
move down that path…. To put it a different way, the costs of exit – of switching to some 
previously plausible alternative – rise” (p. 252). If the FHFA does not adopt the 
proposed, stricter requirements, then the FHLBanks will continue to be exposed to non-
bank, non-insurance entity types, as well as continue to be another general liquidity 
source for bank and insurance members. The costs of exiting the current, loose 
requirements goes up as more members take out advances, and the exposure and scope of 
the FHLBanks continues to increase. It will be difficult to restrict membership in the 
future once more industry groups see the benefits of FHLBank advances for their 
members. These groups will continue to lobby for access to advances, and Congress will 
likely continue to grant their requests. Assuming there is not another financial crisis 
similar to the Great Recession in the near future, switching to stricter requirements will 
only get less and less popular as time passes as more industries will take advantage of the 
benefits of advances. 
 The landscape may be forming for a standoff between those who want to reduce 
the scope of the FHLBanks and those who do not. Even within those who want to reduce 
the scope, there is some disagreement as to how to achieve this, as some want fewer 
FHLBanks while others want restrictive membership clauses. The FHFA is on one side 
while industry groups, some of the FHLBank presidents, and some members of Congress 
are on the other. It is unclear which side will reign victorious, but what is clear is that 
  45 
 
either way, the future of the FHLB System will have its direction for the foreseeable 
future.  
This direction will probably be defined in the near future. Over the next few 
months, the FHLBanks of Seattle and Des Moines will have merged, and the FHFA will 
either have upheld or reversed its restrictive membership requirements. The System will 
see significant changes not only in the short run, but perhaps also in the long run, as the 
floodgates of reform could swing wide open. 2015 will be a critical year for the future of 
the FHLB System. 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that the FHLB System has undergone several changes before and after 
the Great Recession, and could also face significant changes in the near future. Before the 
recent crisis, lending to insurance companies and the MPF Programs were not significant 
portions of the FHLBanks’ business models, but both have been growing exponentially. 
As long as banks hold excess cash and remain cautious about lending, these trends will 
likely continue at least in the short run. Lending to insurance companies and the 
expansion of the MPF Programs may create underlying risks, and with an entity as large 
as the FHLB System, these risks could reach systemic proportions. 
Two of the FHLBanks will merge sometime during 2015, and that could open the 
door other FHLBank mergers. Eventually, there may be only a few FHLBanks left, and 
the remaining FHLBanks may look more like Fannie and Freddie than like their former 
selves. Fannie and Freddie need taxpayer bailouts in 2008, and the same could possibly 
  46 
 
be true of the FHLBanks if they consolidate down to too few entities and concentrate the 
risk. Further, new membership requirements could also be on the horizon. While the 
proposed memberships are restrictive, some have expressed sentiments that the 
membership requirements should actually be loosened. This could further expand the 
scope and size of the FHLB System. Not restricting requirements now can result in path 
dependency with increasing returns as more industry groups will likely lobby to keep 
looser requirements in place. Regardless of whether the membership requirements are 
restricted or loosened, the future of the FHLB System will be altered going forward. 
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